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1Hospital Competition under Regulated Prices:
Application to Urban Health Sector Reforms in China
Abstract. We develop a model of public-private hospital competition
under regulated prices, recognizing that hospitals are multi-service ￿rms
and that equilibria depend on the interactions of patients, hospital ad-
ministrators, and physicians. We then use data from China to calibrate
a simulation model of the impact of China￿s recent payment and organi-
zational reforms on cost, quality and access. Both the analytic and sim-
ulation results show how providing implicit insurance through distorted
prices leads to over/under use of services by pro￿tability, which in turn
fuels cost escalation and reduces access for those who cannot aﬀord to
self-pay for care. Hospital competition for patients will improve social
welfare only if policymakers pay careful attention to payment incentives
and regulation.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many countries, particularly developing and transitional economies, are
experimenting with market forces and privatization in their health sec-
tors. Existing models of competition and regulated prices (e.g., Norman
and Thisse 2000) are not appropriate for assessing the impact of such
reforms, because they are not tailored to the institutional features of the
health sector: pervasive uncertainty, acute asymmetry of information,
health care provider market power, moral hazard induced by insurance
coverage, and diﬃculty in measuring quality and outcomes. On the
supply side in health care, hospital administrators and physicians, who
may have diﬀerent objectives and relate to patients diﬀerently, both crit-
ically shape available treatment. Moreover, a hospital is a multi-service
￿rm, and policies with diﬀerent incentives across services will impact
hospitals￿ overall portfolio of investments and oﬀerings.
The central aims of our paper are twofold. First, we develop a model
of hospital - physician behavior under regulated prices, broadly appli-
cable to the health sectors in developing and transitional economies (as
well as many established market economies). The primary contribution
is capturing multiple layers of decision-making on the suppy side with a
reasonably parsimonious model.1 Second, we simulate the impact of the
latest Chinese pricing and payment reforms on cost control and patient
access. The focus is urban China, both because ￿nancing and institu-
tional constraints diﬀer signi￿cantly between urban and rural areas, and
because the challenges facing urban China more closely resemble those
of other transitional economies.
We develop a model of public-private hospital competition under reg-
ulated prices, recognizing that hospitals are multi-service ￿rms. Three
kinds of agents interact in the model: patients, doctors, and hospital ad-
ministrators. On the demand side, patients have limited choices. Unlike
for many other goods or services, the patient often lacks the time, infor-
mation, and/or acumen to choose optimally between competing suppli-
ers with various prices and qualities of service. In particular, the patient
frequently cannot discern what treatment options are necessary or de-
sirable for his or her speci￿c medical condition, and how the quality of
any given hospital or physician compares to that of others. Providers
derive considerable power over patients from this asymmetry of informa-
tion and from the fact that medical care is a non-tradeable service (see
discussion in McGuire 2000). Nevertheless, consumers do have margins
1Previous theoretical work on public-private provision in the health sector (e.g.,
Barros and Martinez-Giralt 2000, Ma forthcoming) focus on diﬀerent institutional
and research questions than those posited here, and do not model hospitals as multi-
service ￿rms.
3of choice, even in the setting of China￿s urban health sector. The pa-
tient can choose self-care rather than formal treatment (especially for
mild conditions), and typically can choose between hospitals. This is
the primary margin of choice that we include in the model. Once at
the hospital, the consumer has limited voice in the treatment decisions,
except to the extent that physicians take account of the patient￿s needs
and ability to pay.
On the supply side, we use a shadow-price approach to capture hos-
pital and physician behavior. We interpret the hospital-set shadow price
as a kind of ￿reduced form￿ for a hospital-physician contract that includes
service-speci￿c spending caps and payment incentives such as cost shar-
ing between the hospital administration and doctor(s). For a discussion
of this approach, see Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000; hereafter FGM)
and Eggleston (2002). Doctors allocate the available resources across
patients according to patients￿ needs, possibly in￿uenced by the doc-
tor￿s own ￿nancial incentives. Hospital administrators decide on hospital
strategies such as investment in high-tech equipment and the availability
of staﬀ and equipment for various services. They also choose compensa-
tion systems for doctors. For example, the hospital administrator may
set a budget limit for spending on unpro￿table services, but encourage
use of pro￿table services by giving doctors bonus payments according to
utilization of those services.
We use our model to derive analytic results and to calibrate a simu-
lation model of China￿s pricing policies and organizational reforms that
will introduce public-private competition more directly into the urban
hospital sector. Both the analytic and simulation results show how pro-
viding implicit insurance through distorted prices leads to over/under
use of services by pro￿tability, which in turn fuels cost escalation and
reduces access for those who cannot aﬀord to self-pay for care.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on
China￿s urban health sector and administered pricing. Section 3 develops
the model and the analytic results. The remaining sections describe the
simulation model, analyze the results, and discuss policy implications.
2 China’s Urban Health Sector and Recent Re-
forms
The recent epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome focused an
international spotlight on health and health care in the PRC. Despite
China￿s unprecedented economic growth and success in lifting millions
out of poverty, an important component of the social protection sys-
tem ￿ health care ￿ suﬀers from benign neglect. For example, although
the majority of Chinese had health insurance as early as the 1970s, the
4majority lost such coverage during the decades of economic reform. De-
collectivization of agriculture removed the community ￿nancing mecha-
nism in rural areas, and social health insurance for formal-sector employ-
ees in urban areas covers only half of urban residents (see Hsiao 1995;
Henderson et al. 1995; World Bank 1997; Liu, Hsiao and Eggleston 1999;
Liu 2002; and Yip, Eggleston and Meng 2003).
China￿s strategy for providing social protection for urban residents
includes city-based Social Health Insurance (SHI) for government em-
ployees and employees of state and private enterprises. Coverage is ￿-
nanced with a payroll tax, nominally divided between employer (6% of
wages) and employee (2% of wages). The insurance structure borrows
from the Singaporean model of individual Medical Savings Accounts
(MSAs), combined with a Social Risk Pooling Fund for catastrophic ex-
penditures. Funding for outpatient services comes primarily from MSAs
and out-of-pocket payments. The Social Risk Pooling Fund ￿nances in-
patient care, usually after the employee pays a deductible equal to 10%
of his or her annual wage. Patients are also responsible for coinsurance,
with rates that are graded and often feature caps set by local govern-
ment. The bene￿t package varies based on local economic conditions.
The majority of those not covered by SHI self-pay for health services.
This half of urban residents includes the dependents of workers, those
who are self-employed, migrant workers, and those who work in the in-
formal sector. Since these residents typically have lower incomes than
employees in the formal sector, there is a positive correlation between
income and insurance coverage.
Delivery of medical services relies heavily on hospitals, which usually
have large outpatient clinics. Government-owned hospitals form the
backbone of the urban delivery system, accounting for about 50% of
inpatient beds. They were historically ￿nanced by government budgets,
but in recent years rely increasingly on user charges and pro￿ts from sales
of pharmaceuticals to cover operating expenses. State-owned enterprises
(SOEs), particularly the larger ones, often operate their own hospitals,
accounting for approximately 40% of inpatient beds. The remaining ten
percent are in private hospitals, owned by physicians or nonstate ￿rms.
Pricing and payment is predominantly on a fee-for-service (FFS) ba-
sis, with a government-regulated fee schedule. The salient feature of
these administered prices is their distortion from average costs, inten-
tionally designed to provide implicit insurance to poor patients. Prices
for basic services often do not cover even marginal cost. To compensate
providers for lost revenue, some other services￿primarily high-technology
diagnostic procedures and most pharmaceuticals￿are priced well above
average cost. For example, the Price Bureau allows hospital pharmacies
5to charge a 15 percent markup on the wholesale price of drugs. This pric-
ing scheme clearly gives hospitals incentive to encourage overuse of prof-
itable services and skimp on provision of basic (unpro￿table) services.
Recognizing these distortions, several social health insurance bureaus
have experimented with aggregate forms of payment, such as case-based
payments or ￿xed budgets with bonuses and with-holds tied to perfor-
mance. In addition, China shares with many transition economies the
widespread prevalence of under-the-table payments for medical care.
To illustrate how this system aﬀects hospital ￿nances and behavior,
we examined a small sample of longitudinal hospital-level data collected
from 38 government hospitals in diﬀerent municipalities over the past
two decades of reform (see Yip, Eggleston and Meng 2003). The av-
erage percentage of hospital income from government sources declined
from 17% in 1985 to 7% in 1999. This illustrates the signi￿cant re-
liance of government-owned hospitals on non-state revenues￿primarily
user fees￿to cover operating expenses. In the sample hospitals over this
period, an increasing percentage of income came from user fees (26 to
37%) and sales of drugs (39% to 50%). Consistent with the incentives
of the distorted fee schedule, hospitals increased investment in high-
technology equipment: high-value equipment as a percentage of ￿xed
assets grew from 17% in 1985 to 36% in 1999. Government subsidies
(as a percentage of hospital income) are negatively correlated with (1)
drug income (-0.54), and (2) CT and MRI patient volume (-0.41 and ￿
0.11, respectively). These correlations suggest a pattern of substitution
toward high-margin services as government subsidies became a less and
less signi￿cant source of ￿nancing.
Salaries decreased as a percentage of total compensation (from 60% in
1985 to 33% in 1999), while ￿other￿ compensation￿presumably bonuses￿
increased. This pattern corroborates other survey and anecdotal evi-
dence that bonuses, and other forms of incentives for doctors and ad-
ministrators, are increasingly signi￿cant, as they seem to be for most
urban Chinese workers (although much of the evidence comes from in-
dustrial rather than service sectors).2 In 1999, median hospital net rev-
enue was 3.6% ￿ a respectable number given the de￿cit-ridden plight of
many Chinese SOEs.3
Current problems and challenges confronting China￿s urban health
2See, for example, the discussion of eﬃciency wages, wage-payment schemes and
productivity in Fleisher and Wang (2001).
3In the sample, 82% of hospitals had positive net revenue, with median revenue
conditional on positive net revenue of about 5%, and the largest 30%. Median net
revenue among lossmakers was ￿27.7%. This raises the question of how hospitals
running de￿cits cover their expenses. Although budget constraints are ostensibly
hard, there have been no known bankruptcies of government-owned hospitals to date.
6sector include signi￿cant and probably unsustainable cost escalation,
with overuse of high-technology diagnostic procedures and an excessive
proportion of spending (over 50% of total health spending) on pharma-
ceuticals. These problems contribute to limitations on access, particu-
larly for the uninsured and poor. Those who cannot aﬀord to pay often
do not get timely care, or care at all.
Table 1 about here
Chinese policymakers plan to adjust regulated to better re￿ect ac-
tual resource costs, and encourage aggregated forms of payment. In
addition, organizational reform will more clearly diﬀerentiate provider
ownership and tax obligations. As illustrated in Table 1, ￿public￿ hospi-
tals and other healthcare providers will be divided into those that receive
government subsidies (government hospitals) and those that do not (pri-
vate nonpro￿t hospitals). Both will continue to operate under regulated
prices and be tax exempt. Private for-pro￿t providers will be required
to pay taxes and can set their own prices. We assume, consistent with
current evidence, that these providers cater to a diﬀerent clientele and
will largely price services not to be in direct competition with the larger
government and private non-pro￿th o s p i t a l s .
Will the reforms yield the desired results? Since the majority of
China￿s urban hospitals remain nonpro￿t, our model of reforms focuses
on them.
3T h e M o d e l
Three kinds of agents interact in the model: doctors, hospital adminis-
trators, and patients. To capture nonuniversal coverage, we assume two
kinds of patients: i = H are the high-income, insured patients, while
i = L are low-income, uninsured patients. A hospital hires a represen-
tative physician to provide various health care services indexed by j.
Throughout our simulation we will assume that there are two services,
where j = 1 represents pro￿table services (e.g., high technology services
and drugs), while j = 2 represents services priced below marginal cost
(e.g., basic services). Let mi
j represent the resource use for health ser-






represent the increasing and
concave bene￿t (i.e., money-metric utility) that patient i derives from
spending mi










Without loss of generality we de￿ne price Pj as the ratio of admin-
istrative price to marginal cost, so that P = 1 represents a price that
exactly covers cost. Patients must pay a a fraction Ci
0 of the price, where
70 ≤ Ci
0 ≤ 1. A typical insured urban resident often pays 35% of medical
bills, so that in the benchmark simulation CH
0 =0 .35. For the uninsured,
by de￿nition CL
0 =1 .
Simulations of the two-service, two-patient-type model build upon
the functional forms of Keeler, Carter and Newhouse (1998). Speci￿cally,






















We discuss the behavior of the three agents ￿ doctors, hospital ad-
ministrators, and patients ￿ each in turn.
3.1 Physician Behavior
Physicians are primary decision-makers for medical care. The model as-
sumes that physicians decide which patients received how much of which
services, thus de￿ning spending mi
j for each patient i for each service j.
How are these clinical decisions made? Physicians by profession serve
the interests of their patients. However, considerable empirical evidence
suggests that physicians may also be in￿uenced by the ￿nancial incen-
tives of their compensation arrangements (see, for example, Newhouse
2002). Physicians thus act as ￿dual agents,￿ in￿uenced both by their
professional opinion of what is in the best interest of the patient, on the
one hand, and ￿nancial incentives on the other. In China, physicians
treating patients at hospitals are almost without exception employees
of the hospital. The physician￿s ￿nancial incentives therefore originate
with the hospital administrator.4
We focus on a representative physician and assume a simple linear
compensation contract: the doctor receives a ￿xed payment per patient
(e.g., a volume-dependent salary), R, plus reimbursement (1 − Sj)mi
j
for each service j ,w i t hSj ≤ 1. In other words, the physician is re-
sponsible for the fraction S of patient treatment costs. For hospital
physicians compensated exclusively by salary (as was typical in China
until recently), S = 0. Bonuses that increase with patient utilization
arises when S<0. For example, S = −0.05 would mean the provider
is reimbursed (1 − [−0.05])mi
j =1 .05mi
j,t h a ti s ,a5 %p r o ￿t margin
above treatment cost mi
j. Full capitation (which is rare to nonexistent
for Chinese hospital-based physicians) would pay a positive R per pa-
4For a physician to agree to work at a hospital, the hospital￿s compensation pack-
age must meet the physician￿s participation constraint (i.e., reservation utility). For
simplicity we assume the hospital meets this constraint exactly; in other words, the
market for physician services is reasonably competitive.
8tient and leave the physician fully liable for costs of care, i.e., Sj =1f o r
every service j. A mixed payment system features 0 <S<1. Pure cost
reimbursement corresponds to S =0 .
Given this linear compensation scheme, the physician￿s net income
from treating patient i is πi = R − S1mi
1 − S2mi
2 (i = H,L). The util-
ity U of a representative physician features a constant marginal rate of
substitution β ≥ 0 between patient bene￿t and physician income. In
other words, the physician puts weight β on net revenue and weight 1
on patient bene￿t, when deciding on how to treat patients, where β Q 1.










The higher is β,t h em o r e￿nancial incentives in￿uence clinical deci-
sions. We assume the physician takes demand (ni) as given. In other
words, doctors allocate available resources across an existing panel of pa-
tients, ignoring how current spending choices may aﬀect future demand.
The physician￿s clinical decisions also must respect resource con-
straints: only a limited amount of equipment, supplies, and ancillary
staﬀ are available. To capture such constraints tractably, we assume
that the hospital administrator may set a speci￿c budget limit B on how
much can be spent on a given service. For example, unpro￿table service
j = 2 may have a restrictive budget of B2; the physician must allocate
this budget across heterogenous patients while adhering to the overall
budget constraint on spending for service 2. Speci￿cally, she chooses
spending per H patient, mH




2 ≤ B2. For the pro￿table service, B1 may be set so high
that this budget constraint is not binding.
Given these incentives and constraints, a representative physician in



































where πH = RH − S1mH
1 − S2mH
2 and πL = RL − S1mL
1 − S2mL
2 are the
per-patient net revenues from H and L patients, respectively. Let λj
be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint for service j,a n d
focus on the subset of services that are pro￿table to oﬀer in equilibrium,
so that mH
j > 0a n dmL








































=0 ,j =( 1 ,2). (8)
Note in (4) through (7) that apart from the last term representing co-
payment burden on the patient (which diﬀers according to insurance sta-
tus), the marginal bene￿t of spending on each service is set equal across
heterogeneous patients. For example, if all patients were fully insured
so that Ci










= λj + Sjβ. This constant marginal
utility of spending represents a ￿shadow price￿ for spending. The fully
insured patient does not pay a ￿price￿ at point of service for treatment;
yet clinical decisions allocating available resources across patients result
in a ￿shadow price￿ that de￿nes spending, just as the ￿actual price￿
of co-payments would de￿ne spending for a patient weighing treatment
bene￿t against the price of care. This supply-side ￿shadow price￿ arises
from resource constraints and supply-side ￿nancial incentives. Thus we
de￿ne the shadow price for service j as
qj ≡ λj + Sjβ. (9)
The ￿rst term in the shadow price literally represents the shadow
price of resources: λj is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget limit
for spending on service j. Increasing the budget Bj relaxes the budget
constraint and reduces its shadow price λj. In the limit, if available
resources are more than suﬃcient to meet demand (or patient ￿need￿ as
the physician clinically de￿nes it), then λj = 0. By contrast, tighter
and tighter budgets raise the shadow price so that the patient must
be in more dire ￿need￿ ￿ i.e., have high dv
dm ￿ to qualify for treatment.
An extremely high shadow price is equivalent to denying access to that
service for virtually everyone.
The second term in the shadow price, Sjβ,r e p r e s e n t st h ei n ￿uence
of ￿nancial incentives on physician treatment decisions. When a budget
10constraint does not bind (i.e., λj = 0), physician payment incentives
alone de￿ne the shadow price. This part of the shadow price is zero in
two cases: (1) when the physician puts zero weight on own net revenue,
β = 0; or (2) physician compensation incentives are completely ￿neu-
tral￿ with respect to spending, S = 0 (cost reimbursement), so that the
physician neither gains nor loses from allocating spending in a way dif-
ferent from what is in the best interest of the patient. (Of course, both
(1) and (2) could hold simultaneously.) The more the physician values
net income (i.e., as β increases), the more supply-side cost sharing S
shapes clinical decisions. High S encourages low spending: the quality
concern with high supply-side cost sharing is underprovision, stinting or
skimping (and risk selection; see Newhouse 1996 and 2002). By contrast,
low S ￿ particularly S<0, representing fee-for-service or bonuses that
increase in utilization ￿ encourages generous or even excessive spending.
Indeed, the physician may encourage spending beyond the point of
zero marginal bene￿t (i.e., the amount desired by a fully insured, fully
informed patient). The controversial phenomenon of supplier-induced
demand (SID) exists when the supplier ￿in￿uences a patient￿s demand
for care against the physician￿s own interpretation of the best interest
of the patient￿ (McGuire 2000, p. 504). Supplier-induced demand can
arise in the model when q<0, meaning that the physician recommends





j = qj < 0. Since the true shadow price of re-
sources (λj) and the physician￿s marginal rate of substitution between
income and patient bene￿t( β) are both nonnegative, SID with a neg-
ative shadow price arises when S<0( a n dβ > 0). In other words, a
hospital can encourage physicians to induce over-use for pro￿table ser-
vices by paying them FFS bonuses according to utilization. Over-use
is well-documented in many contexts involving FFS payment (see for
example Institute of Medicine 2001 and Newhouse 2002) and widely be-
lieved to plague China as well (e.g., World Bank 1997). Our model thus
allows for physicians to induce demand, but their ability to do so is not
without limit, even when patients are poorly informed.5
With providers allocating spending according to service-speci￿c shadow








Comparative statics on the physician optimization problem (3), or
more directly (10), reveal that spending increases when (1) the marginal
5We build into the simulation a constraint on the extent of supplier-induced de-
mand (e.g., q1 > −0.3) that can be varied in sensitivity analyses.
11bene￿t of treatment aj increases (dm
da > 0); (2) the co-payment price
of care Ci
0Pj decreases, either because of a decrease in the coinsurance
rate Ci
0 or a decrease in the administrative price per unit Pj ( dm
dCo < 0,
dm
dP < 0); and/or (3) the shadow price qj falls (dm
dq < 0).
We show in the appendix an extension to under-the-table payments
(a.k.a. gratuities or hongbao). Patients are more likely to oﬀer such
hongbao payments to physicians when (1) access to care is restricted,
and/or the physician has ￿nancial incentive to stint (qj > 0); (2) per-
ceived marginal bene￿t( aj) is high; and/or (3) formal co-payments (Ci
0)
are low. This simple extension can help to explain the proliferation of
under-the-table payments in China currently, and the possible policy
remedies. For further discussion, see Yip, Eggleston and Meng (2003).
We next turn to the second decision-maker in the model, the hospital
administrator.
3.2 Hospital Behavior and Hospital-Doctor Con-
tracting
Although physicians have the primary role in deciding which patients
receive how much of which services, hospital administrators also shape
clinical decisions in many ways. We capture this in￿uence with two
decisions: how much to invest in equipment and staﬃng for speci￿c
services (i.e., the generosity of the spending budget Bj for each service
j) and the compensation scheme for physicians (i.e., S,w i t hR then set
to ful￿ll the physician participation constraint). In the model, these two
dimensions can be captured with a single variable: the shadow price, q =
q(B,S). As shown above, the physician￿s optimization problem leads
naturally to allocation of spending across patients according to service-
speci￿c shadow prices given by (9). To in￿uence physician behavior
and thereby hospital net revenue, a hospital administrator can therefore
choose a preferred shadow price for each service.
The hospital administrator chooses shadow prices in light of the in-
centives embodied in the hospital payment system. A simple linear for-
mulation, paralleling that described above for physicians, well captures
the gamut of hospital payment methods currently used and/or proposed
in China. Payment includes two components. First, for each patient, the
provider may receive a ￿xed pre-payment (prospective payment), ri.I f
these payments are risk adjusted, ri will diﬀe ra c c o r d i n gt ot h er i s ka d -
justers (such as age, sex, and diagnoses of patient i) included in the risk
adjustment formula. (For an overview of risk adjustment internationally,
see Ellis and Van de Ven 2000.) Few developing countries use such pay-
ment systems, however, and no Chinese social insurance bureaus that
we know of risk adjust hospital payments. We therefore assume that
12the ￿xed payment, if any, does not diﬀer across patients, except to the
extent that social insurance uses prospective payment (rH > 0) while
self-pay patients do not (rL =0 ) .
In addition to r, the hospital receives reimbursement (1 − sj)mi
j for
each service j ,w i t hsj ≤ 1. The hospital therefore is at risk at point of
service for the proportion of spending sjmi
j,a n dsj > 0 denotes supply-
side cost sharing. (A lower-case s denotes the hospital supply-side cost
sharing, and an upper-case S denotes physician supply-side cost sharing.
The two are intimately connected, as we demonstrate below.)
We focus ￿rst on the behavior of a hospital administrator who seeks
to maximize net revenue. Much literature on nonpro￿th o s p i t a l s￿nds
little diﬀerence between their behavior and that of net revenue maximiz-
ers (e.g., Sloan 2000). Later we will discuss the additional constraints
and assumptions aﬀecting government-owned hospitals.
3.2.1 Net-Revenue Maximizers
T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ei st h ev e c t o ro fs e r v i c e - s p e c i ￿c shadow prices, q.
Both spending per patient, m(q), and the number of patients treated,
n(q), vary with the shadow prices, the former according to (10) and
the latter as will be discussed further below. In general, more generous
spending, achieved with low (or even negative) shadow prices, attracts
patients, except to the extent that patients cannot aﬀord to pay and/or
dislike supplier-induced demand.
Aware of the demand response to spending generosity across services,
ap r o ￿t-maximizing hospital administrator can try to attract pro￿table
patients with generous spending on services those patients value most.
The hospital sets a shadow price for access to service j such that ￿the
patient must ￿need￿ or bene￿t from services above a certain threshold in






This shadow price is precisely that which ￿ows from the physician op-
timization problem; compare (4) through (7) and (9). The hospital
administrator will want to design doctors￿ compensation to implement
pro￿t-maximizing shadow prices.
Given the linear payment system, the hospital￿s revenue per patient
treated is ri +
P
j (1 − sj)mi
j (q). Cost is total spending on patient care, P
j mi
j (q)p e rp a t i e n ti, and total physician compensation W,w h i c h
we assume is ￿xed by physicians￿ reservation utility. Demand from pa-
tients of type i is ni (q). Thus the hospital administrator￿s expected net




































Assume π(q) is strictly concave. De￿ne πi (q) as the hospital￿s gain
or loss for patient i, πi (q)=ri −
P
j sjmi
j (q). Unpro￿table patients are
those for which πi (q) < 0.
Ap r o ￿t-maximizing hospital administrator chooses the shadow price





































This ￿rst order condition describes the trade-oﬀsi n v o l v e di ns e t t i n g
shadow prices. The marginal bene￿t from raising the shadow price is less
spending per enrollee, −nisj
dmi
j
dqj > 0. The marginal cost of raising qj is
discouraging pro￿table patients from choosing the provider (−dni
dqjπi > 0
if πi > 0).6
U n d e rc o s tr e i m b u r s e m e n t( s =0 )o rf e e - f o r - s e r v i c ep a y m e n t( s<0))
￿ i.e., whenever the payment system does not include any supply-side
cost sharing ￿ the left-hand side of (13) is zero or negative. Without
any marginal bene￿t to restricting spending, hospitals will not want
to restrict access to services. Indeed, the hospital administrator may
wish to encourage supplier-induced demand to bring in additional fee-
for-service revenues from pro￿table services.
Clearly, the pro￿t-maximizing shadow price can exceed or fall short
of the socially optimal value for a fully insured consumer, q∗∗ =1 ,w h i c h







=a r gm a x[ v(m(q)) − m(q)] = 1 (14)
When patients diﬀer in their insurance status or generosity, socially ef-
￿cient spending levels require diﬀerentiating shadow prices by patient
i n s u r a n c ea sw e l la sb ys e r v i c e .
6As FGM note, ￿the idea behind competition among managed care providers is
that ... the provider by rationing too tightly will lose pro￿table customers ￿ to
balance the provider￿s incentive to reduce services to the existing enrollees￿ (p.838).
14The simulation models the case of two services, j =1 ,2, and two
consumer types. Consistent with China￿s current state of 50% insured
residents in urban areas, we assume 50% of the population of each type,
with the two types distributed identically, so that demand for a health








. Hospital pro￿t( 1 2 )
then becomes nH (q)πH (q)+nL (q)πL (q).
In this two-service, two-type case, the ￿rst-order conditions for choice








































=0 ( 1 6 )
3.2.2 A Simple Case
Since this framework of physician-hospital-patient interaction with the
hospital as a multi-product ￿rm is rather complicated, we illustrate the
primary analytical results ￿rst with the simplest possible case: a single
service and a single patient type. In this case, hospital net revenue (12)
becomes π = n(q)[r − sm(q)] − W and the ￿rst order condition (13)







[r − sm]. (17)
Once again, the left-hand side represents the marginal bene￿to fi n c r e a s -
ing q: reduced treatment costs and thus higher hospital revenues if the
hospital is at risk for any of the cost (s>0). The right-hand side rep-
resents the marginal cost of increasing q: fewer patients (dn
dq < 0), each
of whom is pro￿table (r − sm > 0).
The central payment incentive result is that increasing supply-side
cost sharing (toward fully prospective payment) induces better cost con-
trol and more stringent rationing of care, because the pro￿t-maximizing
shadow price q increases with cost sharing s. This follows from totally
diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to q and s and solving for
dq
ds,n o t i n gt h a t
the denominator is negative by concavity of π(q), and the numerator is
negative because dn










> 0( 1 8 )
15Administrative prices implicitly de￿n et h ed e g r e eo fs u p p l y - s i d ec o s t
sharing for each service, since the hospital ￿shares the cost￿ of any services
for which the administrative price does not cover the cost of care. Thus
s =1− P. (19)
The result above predicts that hospitals will under-provide services for
which administrative prices do not cover marginal cost (s>0) and over-
provide services for which prices exceed marginal cost (s<0). We use
the simulation model to illustrate the interaction across patient groups
and services, but the underlying logic is the same as for this simplest
case.
3.2.3 Government hospitals
Government-owned hospitals may behave diﬀerently from net-revenue
maximizers. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posit that a government
hospital manager has less residual control of investment decisions, and
therefore invests less in both cost control and quality improvement in-
novations, than a private counterpart.
We assume that government hospitals set shadow prices at a given
level and then private hospitals compete by optimizing, given the govern-
ment hospitals￿ decisions. Government hospital shadow prices are ￿xed
at the optimal Nash equilibrium shadow prices chosen by two govern-
ment hospital administrators that (1) care directly about patient welfare
as well as net revenue; (2) do not face stiﬀ competition for patients; and
(3) are constrained to spend no more than a binding threshold amount
per patient. Speci￿cally, the objective function places weight on patient
bene￿t v, similar to that posited for physicians in (2). This is a fairly
standard method of modeling the behavior of providers with objectives
beyond pure pro￿t maximization (see discussion in McGuire 2000). With
the weight on patient bene￿to f0 .5, prices set at the benchmark levels
of the simulation model (P1 =1 .2a n dP2 =0 .85, so that s1 = −0.2a n d
s2 =0 .15), the spending constraint set at the socially eﬃcient spending
per patient, and the travel cost parameter c =2 ,000 (see (21) below)
to represent low competition for market share, the government shadow
prices are qG
1 =0 .1a n dqG
2 =0 .5. We use these values throughout, unless
noted otherwise.
Note that these benchmark shadow prices imply that even govern-
ment providers encourage more use of the pro￿table than the unprof-
itable service (q1 <q 2), that well-insured patients will over-use both ser-
vices (because q<1), and that uninsured patients will often under-use
services (because the co-payment price plus the shadow price exceeds 1).
These are all consistent with evidence about patterns of Chinese patient
16utilization in the 1990s, when government providers dominated because
the private sector share of the inpatient care market was quite small.
We assume that government hospitals are ￿￿rst movers￿ against which
the private competitors optimize, and investigate only the initial mar-
ket equilibrium (i.e., before government hospitals have been able to re-
optimize). Government hospitals are likely to experience adverse selec-
tion as competitors cream skim more pro￿table patients. Certainly this
sequence of events has been documented elsewhere (see for example Dug-
gan 2000). We calculate what volume of subsidies would be necessary
to cover any resulting negative net revenue. In other words, a govern-
ment hospital enjoys a soft budget constraint (Kornai 1986) allowing it
to break even while serving a disproportionate share of unpro￿table poor




A hospital administrator can implement a given vector of service-speci￿c
shadow prices through choices of service-speci￿cb u d g e t sBj and/or
service-speci￿c cost sharing, Sj,w i t ht h e i rs t a ﬀ physicians. If a hos-
pital administrator knows physicians￿ reactions functions (in particular,
weight on net revenues β), the administrator can implement a desired
shadow price vector through appropriate choice of service-speci￿c bud-









j satis￿es (13) and is thus a function of administrative hospi-
tal prices P that de￿ne payer-hospital cost sharing, s, as in (19). The
￿correct￿ degree of hospital-doctor cost sharing S∗
j induces the doctor to
internalize the hospital administrator￿s desired constraint on spending.
For β low enough (or q∗
j high enough) that
q∗
j
β > 1, the hospital admin-
istrator will need to impose a binding budget constraint to implement
q∗
j (since hospital-doctor cost sharing cannot exceed 100%). For further
discussion of hospital-physician contracting, see Eggleston (2002).
3.3 Consumer Choice of Hospital
The ￿nal decision-maker in the model is the health care consumer, or
patient. Hospitals respond to patient demand when setting shadow
prices, as outlined above. Here we detail how consumer choice de-
￿nes patient demand n(q). Consider two competing health providers,
A and B, at ￿distances￿ from consumer i of ρA
i and ρB
i , respectively.
In addition to geographic location, ￿distance￿ measures any aspect of
convenience or taste not captured by health service spending. De￿ne
17c>0 as ￿travel cost￿ per unit distance. Patient i will choose provider
A over provider B if and only if viA ¡
miA¢
− cρA



















i , a patient chooses provider A when viA¡
miA¢
+ c￿i > ui
(as in FGM).
The hospital does not know each patient￿s ￿i but does know the
cumulative distribution from which it is drawn, Φi (￿i). The hospital






















For well-insured patients, demand increases in the spending generos-






dmi > 0. A decrease in c corresponds to an













. In other words, a monopoly can ration
stringently without loosing insured patients, but a hospital in a competi-
tive market (low travel cost c) cannot reduce spending generosity￿that is,
availability of services or ￿quality￿￿much below that of its rivals without
loosing a signi￿cant volume of insured patients.
In contrast, uninsured patients must balance the marginal bene￿t
of treatment against the marginal cost of paying the full price of care.
Moreover, they may face ability-to-pay or liquidity constraints in pay-
ing hospital bills because of imperfections in credit markets and/or labor
markets in China, as in other developing and transitional economies. As
Banerjee (1997) notes, ￿this assumption of capital market imperfection is
relatively uncontroversial in the context of education or health￿ (p.1291).
Given the evidence that a signi￿cant fraction of Chinese patients refuse
hospitalization due to ￿nancial constraints, even when hospitalization
is recommended by a health professional, we assume that liquidity con-
straints are binding for a fraction of uninsured patients that increases as
the total bill the patient has to pay increases (see Table 2).
Thus, in this model the consumer can choose between hospitals based
on reputation or perceived spending, but once at the hospital must ei-
ther accept or reject a ￿take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer￿ of treatment. (We do
not model choice of physician at a given hospital.) It may seem un-
realistic that patients often must choose between an excessive amount
of care and no treatment at all, but we think that this model captures
important features of the reality facing many Chinese patients (and pa-
tients in some other countries). Patients rarely can judge how much
18care is ￿necessary￿ or medically indicated. The hospital and/or physi-
cian may have ￿nancial incentive to recommend expensive treatments,
and often has authority to demand a deposit for the projected cost of
care prior to rendering treatment. (For discussion of evidence regarding
patient access problems, inability to pay and liquidity constraints for
urban Chinese, see Yip, Eggleston and Meng 2003).
4 Simulating China’s Reforms
Although the analytic results above give important clues about the po-
tential outcomes of China￿s reforms, it is also useful to illustrate various
speci￿c reform scenarios by calibrating a simulation model. In this sec-
tion we describe model calibration and the simulation results.
We use linear demand for medical care (as in other health sector
simulations, such as Keeler, Carter, and Newhouse 1998), based on the
average spending of insured and uninsured Chinese patients in the 1998
National Health Survey (Ministry of Health 2001, 2002). The national
data does not disaggregate spending by service category, but we need to
do so to simulate the impact of diﬀerential incentives across pro￿table
and unpro￿table services. Evidence from other countries and anecdotal
evidence from China suggest that demand for the services paid above
marginal cost in China ￿ primarily high technology diagnostic procedures
and pharmaceuticals ￿ is more elastic than demand for the services priced
below marginal cost (e.g., the charge for an inpatient bedday). Based
on the assumptions of more elastic demand for (pro￿table) service 1
than (unpro￿table) service 2 and of combined spending levels on the
all services for insured and uninsured patients from the 1998 National








=2 .5 − 0.001m2.
The demand elasticities of the two services implied by this speci￿cation
are consistent with the evidence on demand elasticities found in the
RAND China Health Insurance Study, i..e., about ￿0.6 for outpatient
services and -0.4 for inpatient services (Cretin, Duan, Williams, Gu,
and Shi 1988; Phelps 1992, pp.124-125).
We assume that all patients are homogenous in the severity of their
health conditions and the value that they place on health (i.e., willing-
ness to pay), and that 50% are insured. As discussed above, we build
in ￿cash constraints￿ for uninsured patients so that for an endogenously
19de￿ned fraction of the population, willingness to pay exceeds ability to
pay.
Table 2 about here
On the supply side, the literature provides less clear guidance on
simulating behavior. Therefore we simulate a range, e.g., of ability to
induce demand for pro￿t a b l es e r v i c e1( s e eT a b l e2 ) . W ea s s u m et h a t
the private sector optimizes given government investments as embodied
in government-hospital shadow prices (as discussed in the ￿government
hospitals￿ sub-section above). In each simulation, two representative
providers compete for patients. In the benchmark, two government hos-
pitals serve relatively isolated markets. In the equilibria with private
competition, a lower travel-cost parameter (c = 100) simulates direct
provider competition for patients. We use the term ￿provider￿ to in-
clude both hospital administrators and physicians, since they jointly
shape patient treatment.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 reports the results comparing the benchmark under govern-
ment ownership to that of private competition (i.e., one government hos-
pital competing with a private sector entrant). The private entrant lures
patients who can aﬀord to pay by oﬀering more generous spending, thus
lowering both shadow prices, and maximizes net revenue by inducing
demand for the pro￿table service 1 (as indicated by a negative shadow
price q1), relative to the benchmark. The private hospital serves a dispro-
portionate share of the insured patients (62%), who can aﬀord pro￿table
service 1, while the government hospital ends up with a disproportion-
ate share of the uninsured (59%). The percentage of patients who opt
for self-treatment because they cannot aﬀord hospitalization increases
signi￿cantly, because spending conditional on use increases (20%). Al-
though the loss of access translates into a lower increase in total health
spending than would otherwise pertain, total spending per person (not
conditional on use) nevertheless increases (10%). The simulation thus
underscores the primary analytic results discussed earlier: pricing dis-
tortions will generate service distortions, with wasteful over-spending on
pro￿table services, and these distortions will be greater with hospitals
who are net revenue maximizers competing for patients, if only because
they have greater ￿exibility to invest in the pro￿table services. Patients
most severely aﬀected are those who cannot aﬀord to pay the charges
for more intensive hospital care.
Figure 1 about here
20Figure 1 shows shadow prices for service 1 and service 2 under four
diﬀerent payment scenarios. To focus on changes in price-cost margins
and their eﬀects on provider behavior, Figure 1 assumes no benchmark
service distortions (i.e., the government shadow prices are uniform at
q1 = q2 =0 .1). The four payment scenarios illustrate increasing price-
cost divergence between the two services. The ￿rst column shows that
providers would choose uniform and positive shadow prices when paid
uniform prices (with some supply-side cost sharing for the two services,
P1= P2 =0 .95, and pre-payment to cover costs, r = 200). As price-
cost margins diverge, however, so do shadow prices and service-speci￿c
spending. As the price for service 1 increases, the shadow price falls.
T h en e g a t i v es h a d o wp r i c ef o rp r o ￿table service 1 indicates induced de-
mand; in the last column with P1 =1 .3 the constraint on the extent
t ow h i c hp r o v i d e r sc a ni n d u c ed e m a n d( q1 ≥− 0.3) is binding. Note
that for a small distortion in prices, the pro￿tability of service 1 actu-
ally helps to make the provider willing to oﬀer more of the less prof-
itable service, consistent with the policy intent of implicit insurance and
service cross-subsidization. However, as price-cost margins diverge fur-
ther, revenue-maximizing providers will increasingly induce demand for
the pro￿table service and restrict spending on the unpro￿table service.
Proposed price reforms in China would move from right to left in Figure
1, from large service distortions toward uniform incentives for spending
across services.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 illustrates how total health spending increases as price-cost
margins diverge, fueling cost escalation.7 Conversely, price reform to-
ward more uniform margins across services will help to control costs.
Figure 3 about here
The ￿aw of using low administered prices to provide implicit insur-
ance for poor patients becomes clear when one focuses on the contrasting
patient and provider responses, as illustrated in Figure 3. As the ad-
ministered price for service 2 (the ￿basic￿ service) falls lower and lower,
low-income patients want to buy more of the service. Call this the
intended eﬀect: lowering prices for basic care increases access because
patients can aﬀord to buy the service. This prediction, however, ignores
a critical factor: supply-side incentives. As the price falls increasingly
7Of course the cost escalation could be even higher if all services were quite prof-
itable; provider eﬀort to restrain use of unpro￿table services actually helps to keep
total spending down and healthcare aﬀordable.
21below cost, providers try to restrict access to the service, and in the limit
may not provide the service at all. This unintended eﬀect undermines
the policy￿s raison d￿￿ etre. Thus when providers heavily shape treatment
decisions￿as they almost invariably do￿lowering administered prices can
actually reduce patient access.
Figure 4 about here
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,u n d e rs o f tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t sf o rg o v e r n m e n th o s p i t a l s
(which subsidize ineﬃciency as well as access), lowering the price of ser-
vice 2 may improve access￿in that fewer uninsured patients are rationed
out of the market by binding liquidity constraints (see Figure 4)￿but
not because providers willingly provide the loss-making service to all
comers. Instead, revenue-maximizing hospitals limit market exposure,
and eventually exit the market entirely, when they are unable to cover
losses from service 2 with pro￿ts from service 1 (due to the constraint
on induced demand for service 1). Access only is maintained because
government hospitals ￿must￿ provide the service and enjoy a soft budget
constraint to prevent bankrupcy (see Figure 5). To the extent that the
government cannot or will not subsidize government hospitals or compel
them to provide such services, access will suﬀer.
Figure 5 about here
In sensitivity analyses, outcomes changed in expected ways. For ex-
ample, increasing the coinsurance rate for the insured patients helps to
constrain spending, but simultaneously exacerbates service distortions
and leaves the insured with a larger ￿nancial burden. The converse sce-
nario is to expand insurance by covering the uninsured (modeled by low-
ering the coinsurance rate for the ￿uninsured￿ from 1 toward parity with
that of the originally insured). This decreases the service-speci￿c shadow
price distortions, decreases the number of nonusers, and increases total
spending. These are all intuitive outcomes of expanded insurance. With
concurrent price reform, the latter outcome of increased spending could
be greatly reduced, since providers would no longer have incentive to
over-invest in high technology equipment. Sensitivity analysis on the
constraint on supplier-induced demand reveals that as the constraint
is relaxed, price-cost margin diﬀerences between services lead to even
larger service distortions.
If private hospitals achieve lower marginal costs than government
hospitals, they can achieve better pro￿t margins even with adminis-
tered prices unchanged. Simulations (described in more detail in the
appendix) show that under plausible assumptions, decreasing private
22sector marginal cost reduces inducement and increases access to basic
services, while increasing private sector market share.
Changes in market competitiveness￿modeled by changing the travel
cost parameter c￿a l s oh a v ee x p e c t e de ﬀects: more market power tends
to exacerbate service distortions, although competition for patients does
not uniformly increase ￿quality￿ or spending levels across services or
patients. Only reform of pricing and payment can address the core
issue of service distortions. And since price distortions remain in place
predominantly to provide implicit insurance, removing the costly service
distortions will require expansion of insurance to the currently uninsured
and/or subsidies to providers linked to serving the uninsured (such as
the program of Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments to hospitals
in the US that serve a disproportionate share of poor and uninsured
patients; see Duggan 2000).
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a model of public-private hospital competition un-
der regulated prices, recognizing that hospitals are multi-service ￿rms
and that equilibria depend on the interactions of three key participants:
patients, hospital administrators, and physicians.
Using data from China to calibrate a simulation model, we analyze
the probable impact of China￿s recent urban health sector payment and
organizational reforms on cost, quality and access.Given the inherent
uncertainty surrounding various factors that will impact the results of
China￿s health sector reforms (e.g., the extent to which some patients
will ￿nd cost escalation a barrier to access and become nonusers), we
emphasize our qualitative rather than our quantitative ￿ndings.
Both the analytic and simulation results show clearly how providing
implicit insurance through distorted FFS prices leads to over/under use
of services by pro￿tability. Competition for patients under distorted FFS
prices contributes to cost escalation. Unless policies otherwise subsidize
access￿through expanded insurance and/or provider subsidies linked to
serving the poor and uninsured￿these cost increases will reduce access
for those who cannot aﬀord to self-pay for care. Thus, ironically but
not unpredictably, using price regulation to try to guarantee access may
actually undermine equitable access to care. Hospital privatization and
competition for patients will improve social welfare only if policymakers
pay careful attention to payment incentives and regulation.
23A Appendix: The Simulation Model
The simulation model assumes that patient demand takes the form of


















The regulated private hospital administrator maximizes (12) taking
prices and the competing government hospital￿s shadow prices (which
enter demand through ui)a sg i v e n .
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and other theories of ownership
and competition posit that private providers often achieve lower unit
costs than government-run providers. To simulate the impact of such
diﬀerential price control on market outcomes, we consider a range of
cost diﬀerences (5-25%) between public and private hospitals, starting
from the benchmark of identical marginal costs, m = 1. Recall that each
administered price P is set relative to m, so that supply-side cost sharing
s =( m − P)/m =1− P. For example, p =0 .8i se q u i v a l e n tt os =0 .2;
P =1 .1i se q u i v a l e n tt os = −0.1. For P>0( s<1), private providers
lower supply-side cost sharing Y % by lowering marginal cost x%, where
Y =( P/(1 − x)) − P. For example, consider the case of P =0 .5
(s =0 .5). If a provider decreases marginal cost by x =1 /6 (about
17%), that provider decreases its supply-side cost sharing to s =0 .4.
Finally, we detail a simple model of patient under-the-table pay-
ments, or hongbao.L e tH be a ￿conversion factor￿ from RMB yuan to
more healthcare spending or ￿quality.￿ A patient pays Hh to obtain

























mj.T h e￿rst order condition for optimal under-
the-table payment hi














We see that the patient wants to purchase extra care with under-the-
table payments hi
j > 0 when access is restricted, and/or the provider
24stints on ￿quality￿ (qj > 0); and/or when perceived marginal bene￿t( a)
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26Table 1. Differential policies towards for-profit and non-profit hospitals 
 
Hospital Type  Policies 
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 Table 2.  Simulation Parameters, Sources, and Ranges 
 
Simulated Range  Variable  Symbol Benchmark  Source 
Minimum  Maximum 
Demand elasticity      RAND China study, late 










--  --  Linear demand for 
each service, 





consistent with demand 
elasticities and average 
spending levels, below; 
service2 less elastic) 
--  -- 






mH* and mL* are desired spending of insured and 
uninsured at benchmark prices and co-insurance rates 
(1998 National Health Survey: urban average spending 
for a hospitalization = 4037 RMB; for uninsured = 2729 
RMB; for SOE insured (LIS), 4424 RMB; for GIS 
insured, 5095).  m* represents socially efficient average 




  20% of L, 
10% 
overall 
1998 National Health 
Survey (recommended 
hospitalization but 





  100% of uninsured self-treat when bill greater than half of 
household average annual income  (14,076 RMB in 1998 
National Health Survey) 
Percent insured  nH  50%  1998 National Health 
Survey (urban) 
50%  100% 
Co-insurance rate 
for insured 
Co  35%    10%  60% 
Profit margin for 
high tech services; 













Profit margin for 
basic services; 
















  q1> -0.3 
 
  -0.1  -0.5 
Competition  Travel 
‘cost’ 
100    50  200 
Private hospital 
marginal cost (% 
below public) 
  0    0%  25% 
 Table 3.  Comparing the Benchmark to Private Competition  
  under Distorted Regulated Prices (P1=1.2, P2=0.85) 
 
  Benchmark  Private 
Competition 
Difference (%) 
q1: Shadow price for service1  0.10  -0.27  -366% 
q2: Shadow price for service2  0.50  0.23  -54% 
nH: Private market share, insured 
patients 
 
n/a  0.62  n/a 
nL: Private market share, 
uninsured patients 
 
n/a  0.41  n/a 
Percent of patients who cannot 
afford a hospitalization 
 
0.04  0.12  205% 
Average spending for insured 
patients 
 
3845.72  4379.10  14% 
Average spending for uninsured 
patients, conditional on use 
 
1993.19  2455.36  23% 
Average spending, conditional on 
use  2961.28  3551.00  20% 
Total spending per person 










(0.95,0.95,200) (1.01,0.95,200) (1.2,0.8,0) (1.3,0.7,0)
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